Safety-First Pension Funds, Governance, and Market Risk: Evidence from China’s A-Share Market
Main Article Content
Keywords
public pension funds, ESG, symbolic management, governance-risk decoupling, state capitalism, China A-share market
Abstract
This paper examines how Chinese public pension funds affect corporate governance and market risk in a state-capitalist setting. Using A-share firms from 2015 to 2024, we show that pension funds display an ESG screening effect ex ante and are followed by higher post-investment ESG scores. The effect, however, is concentrated in the governance pillar and is more than twice as large in SOEs as in private firms. Despite these governance gains, pension ownership is not associated with lower stock-return volatility. We interpret this pattern as governance-risk decoupling: pension funds appear to promote visible, compliance-oriented governance upgrades, but their small stakes and the retail-dominated market limit their ability to stabilize prices. The findings refine the universal-owner view by showing that, in transitional economies, state-backed patient capital may function more as administrative legitimacy than as a direct mechanism of market-risk reduction.
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