Media Studies; Vol.3, No.4; 2026
E-ISSN: 3006-368X P-ISSN: 3006-3671
DOI: https://doi.org/10.70267/ms.v3n4.0108
Published by: Zeus Press

The Digital Divide in Global Communication: Inequality, Governance, and the Contest for Narrative Power

Xuecheng Cao*

School of Media, Film and Journalism, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

**Corresponding author: Xuecheng Cao.*

Abstract

The spread of information and communication technologies has made connectivity central to global communication, yet the benefits of this transformation are distributed unequally. This article examines the digital divide as a structural feature of contemporary global media rather than a mere gap in hardware access. Drawing on scholarship that treats the divide as a complex and dynamic phenomenon, it argues that the divide operates on at least three intersecting levels: access, usage and skill, and algorithmic and infrastructural power. It then traces how the divide is deepened by the politics of platform governance and by asymmetric control over digital content, and considers how these asymmetries become acute in armed conflict, where the ability to generate, moderate, and frame information is itself a weapon. The article concludes that bridging the divide requires not only connectivity and digital literacy but a redistribution of the power to produce and govern the global media environment.

Keywords

digital divide, global communication, platform governance, digital colonialism, media power, algorithmic inequality

1. Introduction

In today's increasingly digitised world, the advancement and application of information and communication technologies have become central to global communication [1]. Connectivity has reshaped the way individuals, institutions, and nations exchange information, conduct commerce, and participate in public life, and it has done so at a pace that would have been unimaginable only a generation ago. Yet behind the undeniable progress of technology lies an issue that is widely recognised in scholarship but far less often confronted in policy: the digital divide. At its most basic, the digital divide refers to the inequality in opportunities to access and use information and communication technologies among individuals, families, businesses, and regions [2]. This formulation is deceptively simple. What began as a measure of whether households owned computers has grown into a far more layered account of how the benefits of digital infrastructure, skills, and data are distributed across populations and nations [3]. The divide is not merely a technical problem of wires and bandwidth; it is a lens through which the inequalities of the global economy, the logics of state power, and the asymmetries of cultural production become visible.

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

For developing countries, this disparity is not simply a double-edged sword but a critical structural challenge. It stifles their participation in the global media economy, exacerbates information inequality, reinforces technological dependence, and shapes the formation of cultural identity. The consequences ripple outward. Nations that cannot generate, moderate, or frame their own digital content find themselves positioned as consumers of narratives produced elsewhere, their stories mediated by platforms headquartered in a handful of powerful countries [4]. Meanwhile, within affluent societies the divide reproduces itself in new forms, as algorithmic systems increasingly determine access to employment, credit, policing, and public services, deepening rather than dissolving existing inequalities. In both settings the underlying question is the same: who controls the digital environment, and whose interests does it serve?

This article develops a comprehensive account of the digital divide as it operates within global media and communication. It proceeds in three stages. First, it conceptualises the divide, moving from the foundational distinction between access and usage to the emerging dimension of algorithmic and infrastructural power. Second, it examines the manifestations of the divide, focusing on the interplay between inequality, politics, and governance, and how these converge to shape the global flow of cultural content. Third, it turns to the specific context of media during wartime, uncovering the consequences of an uneven media landscape dominated by powerful nations. Throughout, the argument is that the digital divide cannot be understood as a gap that connectivity alone will close; it is a question of power, governance, and representation that lies at the heart of global communication.

2. Conceptualising the Digital Divide: From Access to Algorithmic Inequality

The digital divide is a multifaceted issue whose contours have shifted as technologies themselves have changed. Early research defined the divide primarily as a question of access: whether individuals and communities had the physical means to connect to the internet [2]. Yet even this apparently simple dimension proved to be structured by deeper inequalities. Access is not evenly distributed across geographies or social groups. It is shaped by the presence and quality of information infrastructure, which in turn reflects economic capacity and public policy [5]. In rural and low-income regions, high-speed connectivity is often unavailable, unaffordable, or of poor quality, while in wealthier urban centres infrastructure is taken for granted. The distribution of access, in other words, is not accidental but is itself a product of economic and political decisions about where and how to invest [3]. These decisions are consequential because they determine not only who can log on but what forms of participation in economic, educational, and civic life are open to whom.

The significance of the access divide becomes clear when regional contrasts are examined. In countries with mature digital economies, high internet penetration has allowed digital technologies to be integrated into education, health care, commerce, and civic life, enabling sustained participation in the global digital economy. In regions with weak infrastructure, by contrast, the lack of reliable and affordable connectivity closes off precisely those opportunities. The consequence is a form of cumulative advantage: those already well connected derive ever more benefit from connectivity, while those on the margins fall further behind. This pattern is not confined to the global South; it recurs within wealthy nations, where rural communities and economically disadvantaged areas experience forms of exclusion that mirror the global picture. The access divide, then, is both an international and an intranational phenomenon, and it provides the material foundation on which all other dimensions of the divide rest [2]. Without a baseline of reliable connectivity, no amount of skill or aspiration can translate into meaningful digital participation, which is why the access gap retains its foundational importance even as newer dimensions emerge.

Beneath the question of access lies a second, equally consequential dimension: the usage divide. Mere connectivity does not guarantee meaningful participation, because using digital technologies effectively requires skills, confidence, and social context. Researchers have long argued that differences in digital competence—not simply in access—explain why people engage with technology in vastly different ways [6,7]. Two individuals with the same connection may use it to very different ends: one may exploit it for education, employment, and civic engagement, while the other may remain confined to entertainment and passive consumption. This usage divide is structured by age, income, education, and language. Generational differences are particularly visible here. The notion of the digital native describes a younger cohort that has grown up with digital technologies and treats them as a natural extension of daily life, whereas the digital immigrant, typically older, must consciously adapt to tools that arrived only in adulthood [8]. While this binary

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

has been criticised as too neat, it captures a real and consequential asymmetry: younger generations tend to engage with technology more fluently and creatively, while older adults may face barriers of experience, knowledge, and, in some cases, the physical limitations associated with ageing.

The usage divide also operates through the knowledge divide, which refers to the uneven distribution of information and education among populations and regions. Those with access to education and to the social networks that circulate information are far better positioned to convert connectivity into opportunity, whereas those without such resources remain confined to the more passive or superficial uses of digital media. Income, language, ethnicity, and geography all intersect here, shaping not only who can log on but what they can do once connected [2]. Crucially, these gaps are not fixed; they are reproduced through institutions and social structures. A person who grows up in an environment where digital skills are cultivated as a matter of course will accumulate competence, while someone who encounters technology only intermittently will struggle to keep pace as the digital environment grows more complex. The usage divide thus ensures that the promise of universal access, even if achieved, would not automatically produce universal benefit. It demonstrates that connectivity is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for digital equality.

In recent years a third dimension has emerged that deepens and complicates the earlier picture: the algorithmic divide. As artificial intelligence, machine learning, and big-data systems have moved to the centre of the digital economy, the inequalities that matter increasingly concern not access or even skill but the capacity to understand, shape, and benefit from the algorithmic systems that govern digital life [9]. These systems determine what information people see, what opportunities are presented to them, and how they are categorised and ranked. Yet they are designed and controlled by a small number of powerful actors, and their workings are opaque even to the skilled user [3]. The algorithmic divide thus separates those who can engage with and interrogate these systems from those who can only experience their effects, producing disparities in access to information and opportunity that are as significant as, and often less visible than, the original access divide. Where the earlier dimensions asked whether people could connect and whether they knew how to benefit, this dimension asks a more unsettling question: whether the systems that mediate digital life are even meant to serve them.

This is not merely a matter of individual competence. Advanced technologies build on existing knowledge bases and demand specialised equipment and training, which means their benefits accrue disproportionately to those already privileged in the digital order. The complexity of intelligent systems implies a high entry threshold and a long learning curve, and for many communities the acquisition of the necessary skills is simply out of reach. The result is that the infrastructure of intelligent machine learning can widen the divide more sharply than differences in basic skill or usage, reproducing and amplifying social inequalities in unforeseen ways. In contexts where algorithms are used to make consequential decisions about policing, criminal sentencing, employment, and social services [10,11], the divide ceases to be a matter of access to information and becomes a matter of exposure to automated judgement [4]. Those who are least able to influence or contest these systems are precisely those most likely to be affected by them, a dynamic that turns the algorithmic divide into an engine of cumulative disadvantage. The opacity of these systems compounds the problem, because even where harms are felt, they are difficult to identify, attribute, or contest.

Taken together, these three dimensions—access, usage, and algorithmic power—describe a divide that is not a single binary but a dynamic and mutually reinforcing structure. Each level builds on the one beneath it. Without access there is no meaningful usage; without skill and social context, access yields limited benefit; and without the capacity to interrogate and shape algorithmic systems, even skilled users remain subjects of a digital environment they did not design. Conceptualising the divide in this way matters because it redirects attention from hardware and connectivity toward the political economy of the digital environment itself [12]. If the divide is a matter of power and structure rather than merely of infrastructure, then the remedies must extend far beyond wiring the unconnected. It also explains why the divide has proved so resistant to successive waves of policy intervention: each apparent solution has been followed by the emergence of a new layer of inequality at a deeper level. The history of digital policy is, in large part, a history of chasing the divide from one layer to the next, from the extension of hardware to the cultivation of skills to the regulation of algorithms, without ever confronting the concentration of control that keeps generating new forms of exclusion. Recognizing this pattern is the first step toward a response that is not perpetually reactive but addressed to the structure of the digital environment itself.

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

3. Manifestations of the Divide: Inequality, Politics, and Governance

The conceptual dimensions of the divide take concrete form in the everyday operations of global media, where they are entangled with questions of politics, governance, and cultural identity. The global digital environment is not a neutral space in which all voices compete equally; it is structured by deep asymmetries in who produces, distributes, and controls content. These asymmetries are most visible in the realm of cultural production. Global cultural properties and platforms—streaming services, social media applications, and the content they carry—shape the cultural consumption of audiences around the world [13]. Yet this influence is unevenly distributed and filtered through the very inequalities that constitute the divide. In regions with weaker digital infrastructure and limited domestic production capacity, global platforms often dominate cultural life, and their influence tends to run toward commercialisation rather than reciprocal exchange. The cultural narrative that reaches global audiences is thus disproportionately shaped by actors in a small number of powerful economies, while the stories of less powerful communities struggle to find equivalent visibility [4].

This imbalance is compounded by the phenomenon of platformisation, through which social media platforms have come to mediate an increasing share of social, cultural, and political life. The rise of platforms as gatekeepers has created new forms of dependence, not only for individual users but for entire national media ecosystems. As audiences migrate to global platforms, the reach and influence of these intermediaries grow, and with them their power to determine what becomes visible, what circulates, and what is suppressed [14]. For countries with limited technological infrastructure, the weakness of domestic governance in the face of platform power is acute. They lack both the technical capacity and the regulatory authority to shape how their own cultural content is distributed, leaving them dependent on decisions made by platform companies that are accountable primarily to shareholders and to the legal regimes of the countries where they are headquartered. The result is a form of infrastructural dependence in which the conditions of cultural and political communication are set beyond the reach of those most affected by them.

The political and governance frameworks of global communication profoundly shape the digital divide, particularly within the context of globalisation and the international political economy. These frameworks determine not only who has access to digital technologies but also how they are used and who benefits from them. Content flows across borders are shaped by political decisions as much as by technological capacity. States intervene to restrict, promote, or tax digital content for reasons that extend beyond straightforward censorship, encompassing economic protectionism, cultural policy, and the assertion of national sovereignty over the digital environment. The unevenness of these interventions means that the flow of global culture is neither open nor equal: it is patterned by state power, by the strategies of platform corporations, and by the relative weakness of developing nations within these negotiations [4,15]. The governance of global communication, in this view, is not a neutral background to the divide but one of its constitutive forces. Every decision about where content is hosted, how it is ranked, and whether it is removed is simultaneously a decision about whose voices are amplified and whose are silenced.

The consequences of this entanglement are visible in the contrast between technological hubs and their peripheries. Within many societies, advanced digital infrastructure and resources cluster in urban centres, where they support thriving economies of innovation, education, and opportunity. In rural areas, by contrast, the absence of such infrastructure creates a chasm in educational and economic prospects. This intranational divide is a microcosm of the global one, and it demonstrates that the benefits of the digital economy are not naturally diffused but are concentrated where investment and institutions permit. More importantly, it shows that access to digital tools, while necessary, does not by itself secure participation in the broader digital economy. What distinguishes beneficiaries from the excluded is not merely connection but the surrounding structures of education, capital, and governance that allow connectivity to be converted into advantage [2]. In this sense the divide is less a technological condition than a social and political one, and its geography maps closely onto existing patterns of inequality.

The same logic operates across families and communities. The divergent experiences of urban middle-class families and their rural counterparts illustrate how the divide translates into different relationships with global culture. Households with the resources and skills to navigate the digital environment use online platforms to access educational content, language learning, and cultural resources that expand their horizons. Households with more limited access and weaker digital literacy tend to encounter a narrower and more commercialised slice of global culture. The result is not simply a gap in consumption but a divergence in educational outcomes

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

and in the capacity to participate in global conversations. The divide, in this sense, shapes the futures of communities in materially different ways, entrenching advantage on one side and constraint on the other [6]. Because these differences compound across generations, they have the character of durable social stratification rather than temporary technological lag.

Given the depth of these inequalities, it is worth asking whether the dominant policy responses are adequate. A great deal of effort has been devoted to closing the divide through connectivity initiatives, digital literacy programmes, and policies that encourage technological adoption, particularly in low-income and developing countries. These efforts are necessary and valuable; they address real and immediate barriers to participation. But they often stop short of the deeper problem. Providing access and skills does little to alter the underlying inequities in the production and consumption of global digital content. When the platforms that mediate cultural life, the algorithms that govern visibility, and the revenues generated by digital activity remain concentrated in a handful of powerful economies, the provision of access alone risks connecting the world to a digital environment whose terms are set elsewhere [6]. Access connects people to a system; it does not give them power over that system. The persistence of the divide despite decades of connectivity investment is itself evidence that the problem is structural rather than infrastructural.

The implication is that bridging the digital divide requires more than investment in infrastructure and training. It requires attention to the distribution of power and representation in the creation and governance of the global digital environment. The capacity to produce content, to shape the algorithms that determine visibility, and to participate in the governance of platforms are as central to digital equality as connectivity itself. This is not to diminish the importance of access, but to insist that access without agency is a partial remedy. A more holistic approach, one that attends to the socio-economic, political, and cultural context in which digital technologies are embedded, is necessary if the gap in global communication is to be genuinely narrowed rather than merely resurfaced in new forms. Such an approach would need to engage not only with infrastructure and skills but with the ownership of platforms, the transparency of algorithms, and the international governance of a digital environment that currently operates largely on the terms of its most powerful participants. It would also require a frank reckoning with the limits of purely national responses, since the platforms that structure global communication operate across borders and often beyond the reach of any single regulatory regime [14]. The governance of the digital divide, in other words, is itself a global problem, and it will not be solved by connectivity programmes alone, however well designed they may be.

4. Media Disparities in Warfare and the Uneven Battlefield

The stakes of the digital divide become most acute in conditions of armed conflict, where information is not an ancillary product of warfare but a central instrument of it. The global media landscape in wartime is shaped by the same asymmetries that define the digital divide more broadly, and these asymmetries are intensified when the capacity to generate, moderate, and frame information can influence the course of a war. The dominance of the media environment by powerful nations is one of the defining features of contemporary conflict communication. Countries with robust economies and advanced technological infrastructures have established a commanding presence on global platforms, and this presence allows them to shape the narratives through which conflicts are understood internationally. Their frames, priorities, and omissions travel farther and circulate more widely than those of less powerful states, whose accounts of their own experiences struggle to reach equivalent audiences [4,16]. In an era when international legitimacy can shape the material outcome of a conflict, this asymmetry of voice is not a secondary consideration but a strategic one.

This asymmetry has been described as a form of digital colonialism, in which the technological and media power of a small number of states extends over the informational lives of the rest of the world. The concept captures the way that control over digital infrastructure, platforms, and content reproduces the logic of earlier imperial relationships: the periphery supplies the data and the attention, while the core controls the means of processing, governing, and monetising them [4]. In wartime this dynamic acquires a sharpened meaning. The nation that controls the platforms, the algorithms, and the dominant media institutions is able not only to present its own version of events but to set the terms of the global conversation, reinforcing its own political and strategic interests while marginalising alternative accounts. The consequences extend beyond representation to the manipulation of global perception and the reinforcement of stereotypes, as the stories of those living through conflict are filtered through media systems they do not control. For populations whose

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

experience of war is narrated primarily by others, the struggle for recognition is inseparable from the struggle for access to the means of narration.

At the same time, the emergence of social media has introduced a genuinely new element into this picture. Because these platforms allow virtually anyone with a connection to publish, they have opened spaces in which less powerful nations and marginalised communities can gain visibility that traditional media denied them. During conflicts, actors from weaker states and communities have used social platforms to narrate their own experiences, to document events as they unfold, and to challenge the hegemonic narratives circulated by dominant powers [17]. The raw and immediate character of this content offers global audiences a direct and unfiltered window onto the realities of those living through crises, and it has the potential to foster understanding and empathy that the one-sided accounts of powerful media outlets do not. In this respect, social media functions as a partial corrective to the asymmetries of the global media environment, giving voice to those who would otherwise be silent [4]. The capacity of the marginalised to bear witness, and to do so in real time, is one of the most significant changes that social platforms have introduced to the relationship between media and war.

Yet the democratisation of content creation is accompanied by a profound new set of risks, and these risks are inseparable from the algorithmic infrastructure on which social platforms depend. The very openness that enables marginalised voices also enables the circulation of misinformation, fabricated content, and synthetic media. Advances in generative technologies have made it possible to produce convincing fake audio and video—commonly described as deepfakes—that can be used to manipulate public opinion, undermine trust, and inflame conflict. During major armed conflicts, fabricated clips depicting leaders making false declarations have circulated widely, illustrating the capacity of synthetic media to inject chaos into the information environment precisely when accurate information matters most. The immediacy and virality of social media, which grant visibility to the disempowered, also make them effective vehicles for harmful propaganda and disinformation. The very architecture that promised to democratise the story can be turned into an instrument for distorting it, and the speed at which falsehoods travel often outstrips the capacity of audiences to verify them.

This paradox lies at the heart of the media battlefield. Social media simultaneously empowers and is co-opted: it gives voice to the marginalised and yet remains vulnerable to manipulation by powerful actors and by the algorithmic systems that determine what circulates. The ability to control and manipulate information has always been a strategic asset in conflict, but the architecture of contemporary platforms has made this asset more pervasive and more immediate than ever before. Because platforms moderate content through decisions that are largely opaque, the question of what becomes visible—and what is suppressed—during a war is decided not only by states but by the policies of commercial intermediaries and by the algorithms that rank and distribute content [14]. These decisions shape public discourse in ways that are frequently invisible and structurally biased toward the interests of powerful actors, whether those interests are commercial, political, or strategic.

The intense circulation of conflict imagery on social platforms has turned these spaces into arenas for a war of narratives and perceptions, fought as much through moderation and algorithmic visibility as through the production of content. The governance of these platforms thus becomes a decisive, if under-recognised, factor in the outcome of information wars. When a platform's moderation policy, its ranking algorithm, or its willingness to act on misinformation determines whether a particular account of a conflict reaches a global audience, the company behind that platform has effectively become a participant in the war, whether it acknowledges that role or not. The structural silences and fractures in meaning that result can influence the perception of a conflict and, through it, its political consequences. The digital divide, in this context, is not a background condition of warfare but a mechanism through which the power to define reality is distributed and contested [4,14]. Whoever controls the platforms, and the algorithms that shape visibility, holds a decisive advantage in the battle for international perception.

The wartime media environment thus makes visible, in an unusually sharp form, the general problem that this article has traced. The digital divide is not only about who can connect, or who possesses digital skills, but about who can shape the global information environment. In conflict, that capacity translates directly into strategic advantage: the power to frame, to moderate, and to control the flow of information is a form of warfare in its own right. The emergence of social media has complicated, but not resolved, this asymmetry. It has

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

created spaces for counter-narratives and for the voices of the marginalised, yet it has also produced new instruments of manipulation and new sites of concentrated power. Understanding the digital divide in these terms means recognising that the fight for narrative control is as central to global communication as the fight for connectivity, and that the two cannot be separated.

5. Conclusion

This article has argued that the digital divide is a structural feature of global communication rather than a residual gap that infrastructure will close. At its foundation lies the material inequality of access, which is itself the product of economic and political decisions about where to invest. Above this lies the usage divide, in which differences in skill, education, and social context determine what connectivity actually yields. And at the apex sits the algorithmic divide, in which the power to design, govern, and profit from the systems that organise digital life is concentrated in a handful of actors. These levels reinforce one another, so that advantage accumulates and exclusion deepens even as the number of people connected to the internet grows.

The manifestations of this divide extend into politics, governance, and culture. The platforms that mediate global life, and the states that attempt to govern them, together shape who produces content, what circulates, and who benefits. For much of the world, access connects people to a digital environment whose terms are set elsewhere, and connectivity without agency offers a partial remedy at best. Nowhere is this more consequential than in armed conflict, where the capacity to generate, moderate, and frame information becomes a strategic asset. The same social platforms that give voice to the marginalised are also instruments of disinformation and sites of concentrated power, and their governance plays a decisive role in the wars of narrative that accompany physical conflict.

The implications of this analysis are clear. Narrowing the digital divide requires more than the extension of connectivity and digital literacy, necessary as those are. It requires attention to the distribution of power over the global media environment: the capacity to produce content, to shape the algorithms that govern visibility, and to participate in the governance of platforms. As information becomes an ever more critical asset in both peace and conflict, the question of who controls the narrative is inseparable from the question of who participates in global communication. Addressing the divide on these terms is essential if the digital landscape is to serve as a fair and equitable space for all voices, rather than a new medium for old inequalities. The challenge is formidable, for it asks not merely for better infrastructure but for a reordering of the relationships that currently structure global media. Yet the stakes are correspondingly high: if the digital environment reproduces and deepens existing asymmetries of power, then the promise of a connected world will have been fulfilled in name only, while the underlying inequalities it was meant to overcome will have been merely given a new technological form.

References

[1] Castells, M. (1996). *The rise of the network society*. Blackwell.

[2] van Dijk, J. A. G. M., & Hacker, K. (2003). The digital divide as a complex and dynamic phenomenon. *The Information Society*, 19(4), 315–326. https://doi.org/10.1080/01972240309487

[3] van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2006). Digital divide research, achievements and shortcomings. *Poetics*, 34(4–5), 221–235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2006.05.004

[4] Kwet, M. (2019). Digital colonialism: US empire and the new imperialism in the Global South. *Race & Class*, 60(4), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396818823172

[5] Norris, P. (2001). *Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the internet worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.

[6] Selwyn, N. (2004). Reconsidering political and popular understandings of the digital divide. *New Media & Society*, 6(3), 341–362. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444804042519

[7] Hargittai, E. (2002). Second-level digital divide: Differences in people's online skills. *First Monday*, 7(4). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v7i4.942

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.

[8] Prensky, M. (2001). Digital natives, digital immigrants: Part 1. *On the Horizon*, 9(5), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1108/10748120110424816

[9] boyd, d., & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical questions for big data: Provocations for a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon. *Information, Communication & Society*, 15(5), 662–679. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.678878

[10] Eubanks, V. (2018). *Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and punish the poor*. St. Martin's Press.

[11] O'Neil, C. (2016). *Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. Crown.

[12] van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2020). *The digital divide*. Polity Press.

[13] Couldry, N. (2008). Mediatization or mediation? Alternative understandings of the emergent space of digital storytelling. *New Media & Society*, 10(3), 373–391. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444808089414

[14] Zeng, J., & Valdovinos Kaye, D. B. (2022). From content moderation to visibility moderation: A case study of platform governance on TikTok. *Policy & Internet*, 14(1), 79–95. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.287

[15] Mutsvairo, B., & Ragnedda, M. (2019). *Mapping the digital divide in Africa: A mediated analysis*. Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.5117/9789462986855

[16] Simons, G. (2019). Digital communication disrupting hegemonic power in global geopolitics. *Russia in Global Affairs*, 17(2), 108–130. https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2019-17-2-108-130

[17] Boichak, O., & Hoskins, A. (2022). My war: Participation in warfare. *Digital War*, 3, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1057/s42984-022-00060-7

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgment

This paper is an output of the science project.

Copyrights

Copyright for this article is retained by the author (s), with first publication rights granted to the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

© 2026 The Author(s). Authors retain copyright in their articles.