A Literature Review on Research on the Causes and Resolution of Adverse Selection from the Perspective of Asymmetric Information

Main Article Content

Anyi Lu
Yifei Wang

Keywords

asymmetric information, adverse selection, lemon market, screening and signaling, market efficiency

Abstract

Asymmetric information exists when one party possesses more accurate information and holds a more advantage position over the other in a transaction. This information gap often leads to adverse selection, further causing problems such as reduced product quality, distorted market prices and low market efficiency. This article reveals how adverse selection appears in different fields of the market, analyses the main causes of adverse selection and addresses several solutions the researchers have proposed. Different aspects are discussed, including the used cars, insurance companies, the education market and CEO compensation structure. Other topics, such as moral hazard, are also considered. This review examines experimental studies carried out by researchers which tested various strategies to address adverse selection, for example, screening, signaling, reputation mechanism and after-sale guarantee. It provides a practical guidance for future policymakers, firms and individuals, who want to mitigate the negative impact of adverse selection. In addition, it points out areas that require further investigation, which can in turn optimize resource allocation and improve market efficiency. This article may improve the understanding of asymmetric information phenomenon in economic market.

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