Exceptions to the Principle of Non-Extradition of Nationals: A Comparative Analysis of Extradition Practices between the European Union and China

Abstract

Extradition, as a vital mechanism for international criminal judicial cooperation, faces practical challenges in upholding national jurisdiction over its own citizens while potentially shielding criminals and hindering international collaboration. This paper examines the legal frameworks, practical models, and underlying institutional logic governing exceptions to the principle of non-extradition of nationals in both the European Union and China. Employing comparative analysis, case studies, and literature review, it systematically investigates these approaches. Findings reveal that the EU has achieved a paradigm shift from ‘absolute non-extradition’ to ‘principle of surrender with exceptions’ through supranational legislation such as the European Arrest Warrant, reflecting a governance logic of sovereign concession and judicial integration. China, grounded in its Extradition Law and upholding the principle of absolute sovereignty, has instead established a cautious adaptation model of ‘principle of refusal with exceptions subject to negotiation’ through bilateral treaties and domestic procedures. These divergences stem from multiple factors including legal systems, conceptions of sovereignty, judicial traditions, and cultural values. Building upon this analysis, this paper proposes that China should systematically refine its extradition exception mechanisms while upholding national sovereignty. This refinement should encompass adding mandatory provisions to domestic law, standardising exception clauses in bilateral treaties, and strengthening judicial review procedures. Such measures would enable more effective participation in global criminal judicial cooperation, achieving a balance between safeguarding sovereignty and punishing crime.