Patent Insurance Pilot Policy and Corporate Total Factor Productivity

Main Article Content

Yishu Du

Keywords

patent insurance pilot, total factor productivity, risk-taking, innovation quality

Abstract

The difficulty, lengthy procedures, and high costs associated with patent rights protection may discourage firms from engaging in innovative activities. By introducing a risk-sharing mechanism, the patent insurance pilot policy helps reduce the costs and uncertainties arising from patent infringement disputes. While previous studies have mainly examined its impact on innovation output, little attention has been paid to whether patent insurance can improve firms' total factor productivity (TFP). Taking the patent insurance pilot policy launched in 2012 as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper employs data on Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2024 and adopts a multi-period difference-in-differences approach to evaluate its effects on TFP. The results indicate that patent insurance significantly enhances firms’ TFP, with the effect emerging about four years after policy implementation. Further analysis suggests that increased risk-taking and improved innovation quality are two important channels through which the policy operates. The positive effect is more pronounced among state-owned firms, high-tech firms, firms operating in highly competitive industries, and firms located in eastern China. These findings enrich the understanding of the economic consequences of patent insurance and provide evidence for improving intellectual property protection policies and supporting firm development.

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