PE/VC Board Governance and Corporate Value—A Literature Review Based on the Technology and Internet Industry

Main Article Content

Jiaqi Chen
Hong Kong Metropolitan University, Hong Kong, China

DOI: https://doi.org/10.70267/icrafm.202617444451

Keywords

board governance, corporate value, private equity, venture capital

Abstract

This study examines how private equity and venture capital (PE/VC) firms shape corporate value across the lifecycle of technology and internet companies through changes in board governance. Although many studies discuss the governance role of PE/VC firms, there is still no clear synthesis of their main governance methods, the debate over how well they work, and the conditions under which they are more or less effective. This review uses agency theory, control theory, and board function theory to build an analytical framework. Based on a systematic review of existing literature and a comparative analysis of two typical cases, Uber and Netflix, it explains the main ways PE/VC board governance affects corporate value. The theoretical contribution of this review is to offer insight into how a dynamic balance may be maintained between institutional investors and founders, and between securities regulators, listing compliance, and corporate strategic resilience.  

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Published
Oct 20, 2026
Conference Proceedings Volume
Vol. 17 (2026): Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Accounting, Finance and Management (ICRAFM 2026)
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How to Cite

Chen, Jiaqi. “PE/VC/Board/Governance/and/Corporate/Value—A/Literature/Review/Based/on/the/Technology/and/Internet/Industry”. 2026. Exploring Science Academic Conference Series, vol. 17, Oct. 2026, pp. 444-51, https://doi.org/10.70267/icrafm.202617444451.